Public wrongs and the criminal law by Lee, Ambrose Y. K.
  Page 1 of 16 
 
Public Wrongs and the Criminal Law 
Ambrose Y. K. Lee 
 
(The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11572-013-
9231-z) 
 
1. 
 The idea that crimes are public wrongs is a well-established one within the field of law. 
Its role in English Law was explicitly affirmed by Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of 
England.1 Recently, the idea of ‘public wrongs’ has also gained prominence among those 
working on the normative issues in criminalization, most notably in the works by Duff and 
Marshall.2 
 I have no intention to argue against this well-established idea. I do think that crimes are 
public wrongs, but a lot hinges on what we mean by ‘pubic wrongs’. This paper is an attempt to 
explore the concepts that come into play when thinking about what constitutes public wrongs, 
and the role that these concepts ought to play. In particular, I shall argue ‘public wrongs’ should 
not be understood merely as wrongs that properly concern the public,3 but more specifically as 
those which the state, as the public, ought to punish.4 
 This paper involves contrasting criminal law with the civil law of torts. Of course, tort 
law does not exhaust all the different areas of non-criminal laws in our common law systems; 
and no doubt it would also be fruitful to contrast with these other areas of law. Indeed, I 
believe some of the claims that I shall be making about tort law also apply to other areas of civil 
law, e.g. contracts; and I shall make this explicit in the paper when that is the case. 
Nevertheless, contrasting with tort law is sufficient for the purpose of establishing the above 
contention; and I shall therefore leave the contrast with other areas of non-criminal law for 
another occasion. 
 I shall argue for the above contention by establishing the following two claims: (a) we 
should not understand ‘public wrongs’ merely as wrongs that properly concern the public. This 
is because if that is the case, then not just criminal law, but also tort law, should both be 
understood as being concerned with public wrongs; and (b) criminal law should be understood 
as primarily concerned with responding to, by way of punishment, wrongs that properly 
concern the public; while tort law should be understood as being primarily concerned with 
responding to such wrongs by way of compensation. Section 2 defends claim (a), while claim (b) 
is discussed in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 then concludes the paper by drawing the two claims 
together in relation to the above contention; and briefly discusses what follows from it. 
 
                                                     
1
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2. 
I take as a starting point what Fletcher says, “Blackstone had a point in identifying 
crimes as public wrongs and torts as private wrongs”.5 Private wrongs, for Blackstone, refer to 
“an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely 
as individuals”, while public wrongs refer to “breach and violation of the public rights and 
duties, due to the whole community, considered as community, in its social aggregate 
capacity... it affects the individual, and it likewise affects the community.”6 Indeed, in this 
general and vague sense, one may plausibly extend this notion of private wrongs beyond torts, 
to other areas of civil laws in our common law systems, for example contracts, trusts and unjust 
enrichments. Just as torts are concerned with private wrongs in the sense that they are wrongs, 
not to the whole community at large, but to individuals qua individuals; contracts and trusts are 
concerned with wrongs, also not to the whole community at large, but to individuals (groups of 
individuals or legal persons) qua contractual parties and qua beneficiaries respectively. 
Similarly, unjust enrichment is also not concerned with wrongs to the whole community at 
large, but more specifically with wrongs to the plaintiffs had the defendants kept their 
enrichments.7 If this is the case, then one can generalize and say that criminal law is concerned 
with public wrongs, while these civil laws are concerned with private wrongs.8 It is here that 
one can see the idea that crimes are public wrongs. Nevertheless, what I am interested here is 
how best to understand ‘public wrongs’ (and correlatively ‘private wrongs’) in a way that takes 
seriously this distinction that criminal law is concerned with public wrongs, while the civil law of 
torts is concerned with private wrongs. 
 One sense in which public wrongs are public, as suggested by Blackstone in the above 
quote, is that they are wrongs that not only affect the victim, but also the public at large; either 
because they involve wronging the public as a collective, or because the public is harmed 
collectively as a result of these wrongs. Correlatively, private wrongs are then private in the 
sense that they are wrongs that only affect the victim, and not the public at large in either of 
the two ways I described above.  
However, it is not clear whether the wrongs that tort law is concerned with, as it is 
found in our common law systems, really do only affect the plaintiff. Just think, for example, 
serious torts cases of product liability: it seems plausible that sometimes the wrongs involved 
affect not only the plaintiff, but also the public at large. Nevertheless, putting this aside, such 
                                                     
5
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Perspectives”, Widener Law Journal 17 (2008): pp. 719-732. 
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an understanding of public wrongs also seems to mischaracterize the nature of traditional mala 
in se crimes that are central to the criminal law. As Duff argues persuasively, “If we… argue that 
such mala in se as murder and rape count as public wrongs only because they too have a 
harmful or wrongful impact on ‘the public’, as well as on their individual victims, we are likely to 
distort the wrongfulness that makes them criminalisable. Even if a rapist takes unfair advantage 
over the law-abiding (which is at best arguable), or creates ‘social volatility’ or undermines 
trust, that is not what is central to the criminal wrongfulness of his action; what he is properly 
convicted and punished for is the wrong done to his victim”.9 Accordingly, to avoid this 
problem, Duff argues that “[w]e should interpret a ‘public’ wrong, not as a wrong that injures 
the public, but as one that properly concerns the public, ie the polity as a whole”.10 
 Thus, rather than conceiving public wrongs as wrongs that also affect the public at large 
(either because they involve wronging the public as a collective, or because the public is 
harmed collectively as a result of these wrongs), and private wrongs as wrongs that only affect 
the plaintiff, we should conceive public wrongs as wrongs that properly concern not just the 
victim (if there is one), but also the public at large; and correlatively, private wrongs as wrongs 
that do not properly concern the public, but only the victims (or plaintiffs). 
 To say that a wrong properly concerns the public, is to say that it is the proper business 
of the public community, or that the public community has a legitimate interest in it;11 and this 
implies that the public community, or more concretely the state as embodying and acting on 
behalf of the public, may permissibly take actions in response to it, for example by censuring or 
seeking redress from the perpetrators of such wrongs. Nevertheless, one must be careful to 
distinguish such wrongs from those that affect the public’s interest, and those that wrong the 
public. Of course, one reason for the public to have a legitimate interest in a wrong is that it 
affects the public’s interest. But affecting the public’s interest does not necessarily imply that 
the public has a legitimate interest in it. Thus even when your significant other’s work 
performance is adversely affected by the fact that you cheated on him or her; it does not follow 
that as an employer, I have a legitimate interest in the wrong you have done, just because my 
interests as an employer is affected by it. Similarly, it does seem to follow necessarily that 
whenever the public is wronged by a wrongdoing, then that wrongdoing is the proper business 
of the public. Yet the public can have a legitimate interest in a wrongdoing even when it does 
not wrong the public; just as your parents can have a legitimate interest in your wrongdoing 
(e.g. cheating on your significant other), even when they are not wronged by it. It is therefore a 
mistake to straightforwardly identify wrongs that properly concern the public with either those 
that affect the public’s interest, or those that wrong the public.12  
 What then makes it the case that a wrong properly concerns the public, if it is not 
merely because it affects the public’s interest or because it wrongs the public? This is an 
important question to answer. However, for the purposes of this paper, I shall follow Duff’s and 
Marshall’s answer that a wrong properly concerns the public, in virtue of it violating the shared 
values that normatively define the political community in which fellow citizens are 
                                                     
9
 Duff: Op.Cit. Note 3, p. 141. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., pp. 50-51 & 142. 
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 Indeed, it is precisely in not identifying them in this way that makes Duff’s conception of ‘public wrongs’ immune 
from his own objections against conceiving ‘public wrongs’ as wrongs that also affect the public at large. See text 
at Note 9. 
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participants.13 Correlatively, in the following we should conceive wrongs that do not properly 
concern the public, as wrongs that violate some values, but not these shared values. Note 
however that what I want to focus on here is not whether violating shared values makes a 
wrong the proper concern of the public.14 Rather, putting this issue aside, what I want to focus 
on is whether this distinction of public wrongs and private wrongs, conceived merely as those 
that properly concern the public and those that do not properly concern the public, does and 
should map onto the distinction between criminal law and tort law. I shall argue in the 
following that this does not seem to be the case. 
On the one hand, Duff and Marshall explicitly maintain that to say that certain wrongs 
properly concern the public, and thus are public wrongs, “… is at most to say that we have 
some good reason to criminalise such wrongs – which leaves open the possibility that we have 
even better reasons not to criminalise many such wrongs”, but maybe subject them to other 
kinds of legal regulation, for example the civil law.15 Thus it does not follow necessarily from the 
fact that a wrong is a public wrong that properly concerns the public, that it should be part of 
the criminal law and therefore are crimes proper. Under Duff’s and Marshall’s understanding, a 
wrong being a public wrong is only a necessary condition for its criminalization, rather than a 
sufficient condition. Accordingly, not all public wrongs should be part of the criminal law; and if 
there are good reasons to subject some of them to civil law (it remains to be seen what those 
reasons might be), then these public wrongs should be part of civil law (including, but not 
exclusively of tort law). 
 On the other hand, it is also not clear that tort law is, or should be, concerned with 
private wrongs in the sense described above. To put the question rather bluntly here: if private 
wrongs are wrongs that do not properly concern the public, but only the plaintiff, then why do, 
and should, we have torts against such wrongs? Take the previous example of cheating on 
one’s significant other as a wrong. I take it that in the liberal democratic societies that we find 
ourselves in, we do not legally regulate it, neither should we do so. This is because, at least 
within liberal democratic societies, cheating on one’s significant other is a wrong that is not of 
the proper concern of the public. To legally regulate it, is to transgress into a sphere of 
individuals’ conduct that is not of the legitimate concern of the public. Thus the fact that certain 
wrongs are private wrongs that do not properly concern the public, seems to count against 
subjecting them to legal regulation. 
 Of course, one might have qualms over the above example; but the point here is a 
conceptual one which does not depend on the specific example in question: The importance of 
a ‘private’ sphere of conduct, which should be protected from the interference of the general 
                                                     
13
 Duff & Marshall: Op.Cit. Note 2, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs”, pp. 18-22 & “Public and Private Wrongs”, 
pp. 70-72; Duff: Op.Cit. Note 3, pp. 141-143; Antony Duff, “Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law”, in Antony 
Duff & Stuart Green (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
pp. 125-148 at pp. 137-140. 
14
 Indeed, there is the issue of what exactly constitutes the shared values in question. As one of the reviewers 
points out, if they include ‘the reasonableness of actions that may hurt others’, then arguably some of the wrongs 
in tort law would also be violating the shared values in question, and therefore are ‘public wrongs’ in the relevant 
sense. This is true; but even without going into a discussion of shared values, we can already argue that the 
distinction between criminal law and tort law cannot be found in the distinction between wrongs that properly 
concern the public and those that don’t.  
15
 Op.Cit. Note 2, “Public and Private Wrongs”, pp. 75-79. 
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public, even when this sphere involves wrongs, is widely recognized and accepted by many of 
those working on the topic of criminalization.16 But what is not clear is why this should be 
restricted to only criminal law and criminalization. Rather, as I have been trying to argue, it 
should also be extended at least to the civil law of torts.17 It might very well be the case that 
criminal law is more intrusive than tort law. But there is no reason to think that tort law does 
not also constitute an interference from the general public, which is illegitimate or 
impermissible unless what it is interfering in is something that also properly concerns the 
public. This is because tort law empowers individuals to seek and obtain redress for wrongs 
committed against them, through the state and using its judicial resources. This does not seem 
to be justifiable or legitimate, unless these wrongs are also the public’s legitimate business: 
wrongs that the public, and therefore the state, may permissibly take a part in responding to. 
The same can also be said for the civil law of contracts. It also similarly empowers individuals as 
described above, but in this case more specifically for the wrong of breaching a contract that is 
committed against them as a contractual party. In any case, as one can see, if private wrongs 
are understood as wrongs that do not properly concern the public, then it seems, tort law 
should not be, neither is it, concerned with such wrongs. 
 What the above discussion shows is that if ‘public wrongs’ is understood as wrongs that 
properly concern the public, and correlatively ‘private wrongs’ as wrongs that do not properly 
concern the public, then both criminal law and tort law should be understood as being 
concerned with public wrongs. Thus to maintain that criminal law is concerned with public 
wrongs, while tort law is concerned with private wrongs, we should distinguish public wrongs 
and private wrongs from within wrongs that properly concern the public; rather than between 
them and, say for example, wrongs that do not properly concern the public. For the sake of 
clarity and simplicity in the rest of this paper, I shall be using ‘wrongs’ specifically to refer to 
‘wrongs that properly concern the public’, unless stated otherwise. 
 
3.  
If what I discussed above is sound, then it seems a plausible way forward is to 
distinguish different kinds of wrongs that properly concern the public. The following suggestion 
from Duff and Marshall should therefore be in the right direction, or so it seems: 
“Outside the law, we recognize three kinds or categories of wrong. There are, first, those 
that are too trivial to be worth pursuing very far… Second, there are wrongs which it 
would be reasonable for the wronged party to pursue, but which she might also quite 
reasonably shrug off as relatively unimportant… Third, there are wrongs that the victim 
ought to pursue, that it would be wrong to shrug off or ignore...”18 
With this in mind, Duff and Marshall continue on: 
                                                     
16
 For example, Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), pp. 763-777; Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 27-71 and Duff: 
Op.Cit. Note 3, pp. 49-51.  
17
 John Stuart Mill, for example, did not seem to think that the ‘private’ sphere, understood in terms of 
individuality, should only be protected against criminal sanctions. Rather, more expansive than that, it should be 
protected from the power that society (including the government) exercises over individuals. See On Liberty 
(London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974), pp. 59-73. 
18
 Op.Cit. Note 2, “Public and Private Wrongs”, pp. 82-83. 
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“Our suggestion here is that the criminal law should reflect these distinctions, by 
distinguishing three categories of public wrong. The first category is covered by the de 
minimis principle: these wrongs are too trivial to merit the law’s attention at all. The 
second category is that in which the victim should have formal control over whether a 
prosecution is brought – either through a system of private prosecutions or, as we 
suggested above, by allowing a prosecution to proceed only at the victim’s request or 
only with the victim’s consent. The third category is that in which, as now, the victim has 
no such formal control: the prosecution can go ahead with or without the victim’s 
consent”.19 
Building on this suggestion, one might then argue we should understand ‘public wrongs’ as 
referring to the third category of wrongs that properly concern the public; and correlatively, 
‘private wrongs’ as referring to the second category of wrongs that properly concern the public. 
This allows one to maintain that criminal law is concerned with public wrongs, and tort law is 
concerned with private wrongs, while conceding that both of them are concerned with wrongs 
that properly concern the public. 
Furthermore, this way of characterizing ‘public wrongs’ and ‘private wrongs’ highlights 
and supports another distinction between criminal law and tort law, i.e. their respective legal 
processes. On the one hand, criminal law is exemplified by its ‘criminal’ process, whereby it is 
the state, rather than the victim, that is principally in charge of the legal process.20 As Duff and 
Marshall explain, “A 'criminal' model puts the community (the state) in charge. The case is 
investigated by the police; the charge is brought by Regina, the People or the State; whether it 
is brought, and how far it proceeds, is up to the prosecuting authority; it is not for the victim to 
decide whether any decision it produces is enforced”.21 Note, however, I do not take this to 
imply that victims ought to play no role in the ‘criminal’ process. Rather, I take it that although 
the state should be principally in charge of the legal process, it should nevertheless allow 
victims and their views to play some role in it, in a way that most probably is greater and more 
significant than the role they are playing in current practices.22 Anyway, in contrast to this, tort 
law is exemplified by the ‘civil’ process, whereby it is the victim (or plaintiff), rather than the 
state, that is principally in charge of the legal process. As Duff and Marshall explain again, “A 
'civil' model puts the victim in charge. She is the complainant who initiates the proceedings 
against the person who (allegedly) wronged her; it is for her to carry the case through, or to 
                                                     
19
 Ibid. p. 83. 
20
 Of course, as a matter of fact, it is the victim who is de facto in charge of the legal process, for example by not 
reporting the crime or refusing to be a witness. However, the claim here is that formally, in principle, it should be 
the state, rather than the victim, that is principally in charge of the legal process in criminal law; while the reverse 
holds when it comes to civil laws. Now, whether or not victims are right in not reporting a crime or refusing to be a 
witness is, I take it, a different question. See Note 22 for more of this. 
21
 Op.Cit. Note 2, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs”, p. 15. 
22
 Given the purposes of this paper, I am afraid that a detailed defence of this is not possible here. But see Antony 
Duff, “Restoration and Retribution”, in Andrew von Hirsch et al. (eds.), Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice 
(Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 43-59;  Op.Cit. Note 2, “Public and Private Wrongs”, pp. 81-82; and Sandra 
Marshall, “Victims of Crime: Their Station and its Duties”, Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy 7(2) (2004): pp. 104-117. 
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drop it... it is for her to decide whether the case is brought and pursued, and whether the 
decision is enforced; there is no thought that she has a duty to bring a case”.23  
 As one can see, if public wrongs are wrongs that victims ought to pursue, then it seems 
the ‘criminal’ process is appropriate to the criminal law, which is concerned with such public 
wrongs. Similarly, if private wrongs are wrongs that victims could reasonably decide to pursue 
or not, then it seems the ‘civil’ process is appropriate to tort law, which is concerned with such 
private wrongs. 
Yet, despite all this, the problem with this characterization of public wrongs and private 
wrongs is that it results in a rather implausible picture of criminal law and tort law. There is a 
sense in which criminal law and civil law, as they are found in our common law systems, are 
concerned with different kinds of wrongs. This is especially the case when we contrast criminal 
law with the civil law of contracts, where the latter are concerned with contractual wrongs. It 
might very well be plausible to see such wrongs as different from the ones that concern the 
criminal law, and it might also be plausible to argue that with regard to these kinds of wrongs, 
the wronged party may ‘reasonably shrug off as relatively unimportant’ to pursue.24 The same 
can also be said about some torts: it is surely a wrong that people trespass into others’ private 
property. But it also seems like a kind of wrong that, even though it is reasonable for the 
owners to pursue the case against those who trespass their private property, especially when 
they incur a loss because of it, it is also reasonable for the owners to choose not to do so. 
 But things look a bit different when we contrast criminal law with other torts. It seems 
that they are sometimes concerned with the same kind of wrongs. As Lamond observes, “Many 
crimes, especially traditional crimes against the person and property, have a civil law 
analogue”.25 Just as there are criminal laws against bodily assaults, there are also torts against 
bodily assaults.26 Thus rather than saying that criminal law and tort law are each concerned 
with different kinds of wrongs, it seems more accurate to say that the wrongs that they are 
concerned with overlap with each other.  
 Thus if we understand public wrongs and private wrongs as two different kinds of 
wrongs that properly concern the public, it seems that we would then be unable to account for 
the fact that, in many of our common law systems, the wrongs that criminal law and tort law 
are each concerned with overlap with each other. But it seems plausible that they should, at 
the very least, overlap with each other; that there should be, for example, criminal laws against 
bodily assaults and torts against bodily assaults. If that is the case, then to arrive at an adequate 
understanding of ‘public wrongs’ and ‘private wrongs’, we should not just be distinguishing 
different kinds of wrongs within the wrongs that properly concern the public. Rather, we should 
                                                     
23
 Op.Cit. Note 2, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs”, p. 15. See also John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, 
“Torts as Wrongs”, Texas Law Review 88(5) (2010): pp. 917-986 on torts as a civil recourse. Note also that all this is 
compatible with the claim that even under the ‘civil’ process, the state may permissibly, and indeed does, take 
measures to incentivise plaintiffs to bring claims forward. 
24
 Maybe the same can also be held for other areas of civil laws: trusts and unjust enrichments, which are 
respectively concerned with equitable wrongs and wrongs of not disgorging unjust enrichments. 
25
 Lamond: Op.Cit. Note 4, p. 630. 
26
 Of course, the same wrong can be described differently in criminal law and civil law, because of their respective 
differences in, say, legal liability. But that does not detract from the fact that their differing descriptions are 
referring to the same wrong, i.e. the conduct in question. 
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also be focusing on the different responses that criminal law and tort law afford to these 
wrongs, and conceive ‘public wrongs’ and ‘private wrongs’ in terms of these responses. 
 
4. 
 But what are the responses that criminal law and tort law respectively afford to wrongs 
that properly concern the public? Here is one suggestion: criminal law responds to them by way 
of punishment, while tort law responds to them by way of compensation. The thought here is 
that criminal law is primarily concerned with punishing those who have committed such 
wrongs; by doing so, not only does it deter them from re-offending and others from committing 
such wrongs, it also censures (or more seriously, condemns) such wrongs and those who 
commit them.27 On the other hand, tort law is primarily concerned with determining and 
exacting compensation from those who commit such wrongs to compensate for the losses that 
individuals suffer as a result of such wrongs.28 
 Of course, punitive (or exemplary) damages can be awarded in tort cases; and at least in 
some common law systems, like for example the English one, compensation orders can be 
imposed for criminal offences.29 All these might lead one to conclude that “... the dividing line 
[between criminal law and civil law including torts] lies, not in the distinction between punitive 
and compensatory function. Indeed, the common law has never restricted punishment 
exclusively to the domain of the criminal law, or compensation exclusively to the domain of the 
civil law”.30 
 However, it is not at all clear that all these undermine the claim that criminal law is 
primarily concerned with punishment, while tort law is primary concerned with compensation.  
Firstly, on compensation orders and criminal law: one must note that an order of compensation 
can be a form of punishment;31 and arguably, appropriately so in some cases.32 Thus the 
question to ask here is not merely whether there are compensation orders, but whether they 
are imposed as a form of punishment; and even in cases where they are not, whether they are 
imposed in addition to punishment. Similarly, on punitive damages and tort law: punitive 
damages raise a lot of questions; for example, whether their imposition can ever be justified 
given the civil law procedures in torts.33 But assuming that they are defensible for the sake of 
                                                     
27
 I take it that legal punishment, if it is to be justified at all, must involve the communication of censure or 
condemnation. But I remain open as to whether any additional element of deterrence can be justified or not. Thus 
I shall address both the elements of censure and deterrence when I talk about legal punishment in this paper. The 
issue also partly turns on whether the ‘hard treatment’ aspect of legal punishment, if it can be justified at all, can 
only be justified in terms of deterrence, or can nevertheless be justified as part of the communicative process of 
censure. For a view of the former, see Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: 
Exploring the Principles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 17-27 & 92-109; while for a view of the 
latter, see Antony Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pp. 79-88 & 106-112. 
28
 See also Gardner: Op.Cit. Note 7, pp. 47-57. 
29
 Lucia Zedner, “Reparation and Retribution: Are They Reconcilable?”, The Modern Law Review 57 (1994): pp. 228-
250 at pp. 239-240. 
30
 Ralph Cunningham, “Should Punitive Damages be Part of the Judicial Arsenal in Contract Cases?”, Legal Studies 
26(3) (2006): pp. 369-363 at p. 381. 
31
  See, for example, Duff: Op.Cit. Note 27, p. 161. See also Zedner: Op.Cit. Note 29, pp. 239-240. 
32
 Here I have in mind, for example, minor offences of property damage.  
33
 For a good critical discussion of the arguments against punitive damages, see Cunningham: Op.Cit. Note 30, pp. 
380-384. 
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argument,34 we still need to ask whether compensatory damages are the default awards on 
which punitive damages are ‘piggybacked’, in the sense that they are awarded either to 
complement compensatory damages or when there can be no compensatory damages. 
 Of course, it is a matter of legal doctrinal research whether, as they are found in our 
common law systems, compensation orders in criminal law are indeed imposed as a form of 
punishment, or in addition to it; and punitive damages do indeed ‘piggyback’ on compensatory 
damages in tort law in the way I described. However, this is beyond the ambit of this paper. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of such research proving otherwise, the above discussion shows 
the mere fact that there are compensation orders in criminal law, and punitive damages in tort 
law, does not by itself undermine the claim that criminal law is primarily concerned with 
punishment, while tort law is primarily concerned with compensation. It is just that while they 
are respectively concerned with that, they are also sometimes concerned with other goals or 
purposes that can be served respectively by compensation orders and punitive damages. 35 
 Indeed, there is another (more theoretical) reason to hold this claim about criminal law 
and tort law: it can support the distinction between the ‘criminal’ process in criminal law and 
the ‘civil’ process in tort law; as I shall try to argue in the following. 
  Recall that, according to Duff and Marshall, wrongs properly concern the public (i.e. the 
polis, the state, fellow citizens etc.), in virtue of the fact that such wrongs violate the shared 
values that normatively define the political community in which fellow citizens are participants. 
It is in this sense that such wrongs, when committed, are shared by both the victims and fellow 
citizens.36 
 Given the nature of such wrongs, the public, state, polis therefore ought to respond to 
them by way of punishment. As Duff argues, “They are wrongs that must be publicly identified 
and condemned, in that for a polity not to condemn them, or not to make efforts to identify 
and condemn their perpetrators, would be to fail to take seriously both the wrongs as they 
impact on their victims, and the values to which the polity is supposedly committed”.37 Of 
course, the state is, in some sense, responding to such wrongs when it publicly declares them 
as wrongs and assigns punishments to them. However, responding to them in a way that takes 
seriously their being wrongs, the values they violate and their impact on the victims, does not 
merely involve recognizing them as wrongs worthy of punishment, neither does it just involve 
(in a way more like the ‘civil’ process) responding to such wrongs only when a case for them so 
happens to be brought forward. It also involves taking an initiative to investigate alleged 
wrongdoing, identify the perpetrators, censure them for their wrongdoings, and if possible, 
deter them or others from such wrongdoings. In other words, it is by being principally in charge 
                                                     
34
 For example, Markel defends punitive damages as intermediate sanctions (between compensatory damages and 
criminal fines) that advance the public’s interest in retributive justice because of the practical limitations of the 
criminal law. As intermediate sanctions, they do not need procedures as robust as those in the criminal law, 
though admittedly they should be more stringent than those afforded in the civil law. See Dan Markel, “Retributive 
Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Damages”, Cornell Law Review 94 (2009): 239-340.  
35
 Thus, for example, compensation orders can be imposed in addition to punishment, to spare the victim from 
claiming compensatory damages from the defendant through a separate civil case, which in turn reduces 
institutional costs. As for punitive damages, it can be awarded, for example, to advance the public’s interest in 
retributive justice, when the criminal law fails to do so because of its practical limitations. See above note for the 
latter. 
36
 Op.Cit. Note 13. 
37
 Duff: Op.Cit. Note 3, p. 143. 
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of the legal process in the criminal law, that the state is responding to wrongs that properly 
concern the public, and punishing them, in a way that takes these wrongs, and the values they 
violate, seriously. Hence the proper legal process for criminal law is the ‘criminal’ process. 
 Of course, as I have already explained earlier, arguing that the state is principally in 
charge of the legal process in criminal law does not preclude the role that victims ought to play 
in it. This comes out in the above discussion, since part of what we are taking seriously when 
responding to such wrongs is their impact on victims. Nevertheless, in arguing that the state 
ought to respond to such wrongs by way of punishment, I do not mean that they ought to do so 
categorically, since it might be outweighed by other considerations. Thus with regard to 
criminalization, some wrongs might be (in line with the de minimis principle) so trivial or minor 
that do not worth or deserve the state’s punitive response.38 Even for those wrongs where that 
is not the case, we must still ask what are the costs and risks that are involved in criminalizing 
them:39 whether, say for example, doing so would lead to more harm than good; and be 
prepared to concede that sometimes, some of them might just very well be too costly for the 
state to respond by way of punishment, and therefore they should not be criminalized.40 Even 
for those that are rightfully criminalized, it might still be the case that the state ought not to 
respond to the wrong (e.g. by pursuing the case through the prosecution) in this particular 
instance because of other countervailing considerations; for example when doing so would 
have a detrimental impact on the victims, or on the significant and important interests of the 
public. Thus in arguing that the state ought to respond to wrongs that properly concern the 
public by way of punishment, and that the ‘criminal’ process is the proper legal process for 
criminal law because of that, I am not denying the relevance of other reasons (e.g. the ones I 
mentioned above) in decisions for the criminalization and prosecution of such wrongs which, 
where appropriate, may count against their criminalization or prosecution.  
 What about tort law then? Do the considerations that support the ‘criminal’ process in 
criminal law not also support the same process in tort law? Does the state also not seem to 
take seriously such wrongs “as they impact on their victims”, and the loss they suffer as a result 
of them, if it does not respond to them by way of compensation? That, I concede, is true; and 
that is why there should be tort laws that determine and exact compensation for these wrongs. 
However, there is a reason here that stops these same considerations from taking us all the 
way to the ‘criminal’ process, as it was the case in criminal law; and that reason is that tort law 
is primarily concerned with compensation, as a way of responding to wrongs that properly 
concern the public. 
 When we talk about compensation, more specifically compensation in tort law, which 
the wrongdoer owes to those who suffer a loss because of his wrongdoing;41 we are talking 
                                                     
38
 See, for example, Duff & Marshall: Op.Cit. Note 2, “Public and Private Wrongs”, p. 83; and Douglas Husak, 
Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 137-145. 
39
 Not just monetary related ones, but most importantly and significantly, moral costs and risks. See, for example, 
Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, “Prevention and Criminalization: Justifications and Limits”, New Criminal Law 
Review 15(4) (2012): pp. 542-571 at pp. 551-552. 
40
 Whether they should be subject to other forms of legal regulation is another question. 
41
 Of course, there are other kinds of compensation. For example, as a welfare provider, the state might owe 
compensation for the loss that victims of crime suffer, even when the state played no role whatsoever in these 
crimes; or it might also owe compensation for the loss that its citizens incur merely as a result of bad luck etc… 
However, these are not the kinds of compensation that we are talking about in tort law.   
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about what they are legitimately entitled to from the wrongdoer, in virtue of the loss they 
suffered from his wrongdoing, to compensate this loss of theirs.  This entitlement, I take it, is 
grounded in the defendant’s (secondary) obligation to best fulfill the reasons that underlie the 
(primary) obligation owed to the plaintiff, which arises in virtue of the defendant violating the 
latter obligation in committing the tort.42 Of course, it does not merely follow from this that the 
secondary obligation has to take the form of compensating losses. However, since the primary 
obligations in torts are largely negative,43 it seems that the best way for the defendant to fulfill 
the reasons that underlie these primary obligations owed to the plaintiff, when he has already 
violated them, should at least include compensating the losses that the plaintiff suffered 
because of the violation. Thus if A has already injured B through A’s negligence, then it seems 
that the best way for A now to fulfill the reasons for not injuring others through negligence, 
should at least include compensating the losses that B suffers because of the injuries caused by 
his negligence.44 It is this secondary obligation to compensate losses that grounds the kind of 
compensation in tort law, and what exactly that amounts to is made determinate and precise 
by tort law. Nevertheless, as it should be clear from the talk of ‘obligation’ here, this 
compensation is something that the defendants owe to the plaintiffs. It is something that the 
plaintiffs are legitimately entitled to from the defendants, and therefore may legitimately 
demand for it from them; and that should be made available to the plaintiffs if they happen to 
do so, but they may also legitimately refrain from demanding for it. Thus plaintiffs should be 
the ones who are principally in charge of the legal process in tort law. This is because the kinds 
of compensation that tort law is primarily concerned with are what they are legitimately 
entitled to, for which they may legitimately pursue from the defendant, or not. Had this not 
been the case, then it is hard to see how the compensation that tort law is primarily concerned 
with are those that the defendants owe to the plaintiff, and from whom the plaintiff is 
legitimately entitled to. Hence the proper legal process for tort law is the ‘civil’ process. 
 Indeed, I think the above argument can also be similarly extended to the civil law of 
contracts. Just like in committing a tort, a defendant also violates a (primary) obligation owed 
to the plaintiff in breaching a contract. This then also gives rise to a (secondary) obligation the 
defendant owes to the plaintiff, to best fulfill the reasons that underlie the now violated 
(primary) obligation. Of course, unlike torts, the primary obligations in question here are 
voluntarily incurred. But there is no reason to think that just because the primary obligation is 
voluntarily incurred, then a secondary obligation cannot arise when the former is violated; since 
the reasons underlying the now violated, but voluntarily incurred, primary obligation are still 
present, they should still be fulfilled in the (second) best way. Thus if I fail to deliver my product 
at a specified time as per our contract, the reason behind this primary obligation that I have 
violated is still present, i.e. that I have agreed to deliver my products to you, which should still 
be fulfilled in the best way now possible, e.g. that I now belatedly deliver my product to you. 
 It is true that, as the example shows, because the primary obligations in contracts are 
largely positive, it seems that the secondary obligations which arise from them would be 
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 John Gardner, “What is Tort Law for? Part 1: The Place for Corrective Justice”, Law and Philosophy 30(1) (2011): 
pp. 1-50 at pp. 28-37. 
43
 Note that even if there are positive primary obligations in torts, this does not undermine the argument or the 
conclusion. See the subsequent discussion on contract law. 
44
 Ibid., p. 40. 
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specific performance rather than compensation: if I have already failed to perform an act as 
required, then the second best thing I can do now is to perform that act. However, as Gardner 
points out, compensation (especially monetary) is normally preferable to specific performance 
as a legal remedy for breaches of contract, because of the practical difficulties of legally 
enforcing specific performance for such cases, which can be bypassed with compensation.45 
Thus the form this secondary obligation takes in contract law is normally compensation rather 
than specific performance. It is in this sense that I would maintain contract law is also primarily 
concerned with responding to wrongs by way of compensation, just like tort law.  
 Of course, there are awards of punitive damages in contracts, just like in torts;46 but 
here, we similarly need to ask whether they ‘piggyback’ on compensation and specific 
performance, in the sense that they are awarded either to complement them, or when there 
can be no compensation or specific performance. Furthermore, given the nature of the primary 
obligations in contracts, the ‘losses’ to be compensated here would most probably be 
conceptualized differently from those in torts. Since the primary obligations in contracts are 
largely positive, the ‘loss’ to be compensated here, as the second best way to fulfill the reasons 
that underlie such positive obligations which have already been violated, should (all things 
being equal) be conceptualized in terms of the plaintiff’s position that is expected from the 
performance of the contract: If I fail to deliver you my products as per our agreement, then the 
second best thing I can do now, short of belatedly delivering you my products, is to compensate 
you to the position that is expected had I originally delivered you my products. On the other 
hand, since the primary obligations in torts are largely negative, the ‘loss’ to be compensated 
here should (all things being equal) be conceptualized in terms of the plaintiff’s position had the 
tort not taken place: If I fail to take reasonable care and injure you, then the second best thing I 
can do now (I cannot not injure you now of course) is to compensate you to the position had I 
not injured you in the first place. Thus, in maintaining that contract law, like tort law, is also 
primarily concerned with responding to wrongs by way of compensation; it does not follow that 
the ‘losses’ or ‘damages’ to be compensated are to be conceptualized in the same way between 
the two, given that their respective primary obligations are largely different. 
Nevertheless, in any case, whatever form this secondary obligation takes in contract 
law, be it compensation or specific performance, it is something that the defendant owes to the 
plaintiff in virtue of breaching the contract, to which the plaintiff is legitimately entitled to from 
the defendant; and if the above argument is sound, then the proper legal process for contract 
law is also the ‘civil’ process. 
However, all this talk of ‘legitimate entitlement’ suggests an objection against the 
‘criminal’ process in criminal law: aren’t victims of wrongs also legitimately entitled to punish 
the wrongdoer? If so, does it not also follow that it should be the ‘civil’ process in criminal law, 
contrary to what I have argued earlier? It might very well be true victims of wrongs are also 
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 Ibid., pp. 44-45. For example, it would be easier and less oppressive to exact monetary compensation from 
unwilling and uncooperative defendants than to enforce specific performance. Indeed, in such cases, enforcing 
specific performance might be detrimental to the plaintiff, e.g. when it leads to a sub-standard performance, which 
can be bypassed with monetary compensation. Of course, if the defendant was willing and cooperative to start 
with, then most probably it would have been settled out of court. 
46
 However, as I understand it, courts are much more reluctant in awarding punitive damages for breaches of 
contract than they are for torts. 
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legitimately entitled to punish the wrongdoer,47 but there is a crucial difference here between 
criminal law as punishment and tort law as compensation. Both, as I have argued, are 
concerned with wrongs that properly concern the public. But as argued by Duff and Marshall, 
the public shares these wrongs with the victims, in virtue of the fact that such wrongs violate 
the shared values that normatively define the political community in question.48 Of course, we 
should not take this so far as to say that the public is also wronged by such wrongs;49 but the 
argument for the ‘criminal’ process in criminal law is that not only do such wrongs properly 
concern the public because of this, but the public owes it to its fellow members, and indeed the 
victim as a fellow member, to take seriously these wrongs and the shared values they violate, 
by punishing them; and correlatively, as members of the political community, victims also owe 
it to the public (and arguably themselves), to pursue this cause.50 Note that this element of 
‘sharing’ is noticeably absent in compensation for the losses from these wrongs. Although the 
public shares these wrongs with the victims in the way I described above, it does not share the 
losses that victims suffer as a result of these wrongs. It might share a loss in the sense that it, 
just like the victims, suffers a loss as a result of these wrongs. But in that case, the public is as 
much a ‘victim’ of these wrongs as individual victims. Thus the above argument for the 
‘criminal’ process in criminal law is not available in the case of tort law;51 and if my previous 
argument on the nature of compensation as what plaintiffs (or victims) are legitimately entitled 
to is sound, then the proper legal process for tort law should be the ‘civil’ process. 
 So, although criminal law and tort law are both concerned with wrongs that properly 
concern the public; criminal law is primarily concerned with responding to them by way of 
punishment, while tort law is primarily concerned with responding to them by way of 
compensation. I have also shown that this latter claim similarly holds for contract law. 
Furthermore, as I have argued, by conceiving them in this way, we can also see why their 
respective legal processes are appropriate to each of them. Since criminal law is primarily 
concerned with affording a punitive response to wrongs that properly concern the public, it is 
therefore appropriate for the state to be principally in charge of the legal process (i.e. the 
‘criminal’ process). On the other hand, since tort law (and contract law) is primarily concerned 
with affording a compensatory response to such wrongs - where this is something that plaintiffs 
are legitimately entitled to from the wrongdoers - it is therefore the plaintiffs, rather than the 
state, who should be principally in charge of the legal process (i.e. the ‘civil’ process).52  
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 See, for example, John Locke, “The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, 
Extent, and End of Civil Government”, in Peter Laslett (ed. & intro.), Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge, New 
York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1988), §8-13; but see also §128-130. 
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 See Note 13. 
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 As Lamond rightly argues against, see Op.Cit. Note 4, pp. 616-620. 
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 Duff & Marshall: Op.Cit. Note 2, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs”, pp. 18-22 & “Public and Private Wrongs”, 
pp. 84-85. See also text at Note 37.   
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 The same applies to contract law, but I shall not expand on this for the sake of brevity. 
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 Or to put all this more generally: there are two issues here; (i) whether the state’s response to such wrongs is 
punitive or compensatory, and (ii) whether the state is responding to them directly or indirectly. The argument 
here is that there is a relationship between the two, given the nature of the wrongs and the responses in question. 
If the state’s response is punitive, then it should take the form of a direct response; while if the state’s response is 
compensatory, then it should take the form of an indirect response. For the general distinction between direct and 
indirect responses to wrongs; see, for example, Michelle Dempsey, Prosecuting Domestic Violence: A Philosophical 
Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press 2009), pp. 95-98 & 185-192.  
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Accordingly, ‘public wrongs’ should therefore be understood as wrongs which should be 
punished by the state; while ‘private wrongs’ are wrongs which the state should, for those who 
suffer losses because of them, determine and obtain the compensation that they are entitled to 
from the perpetrators. It is in this sense that we should understand the distinction that criminal 
law is concerned with public wrongs, while the civil law of torts (and contracts) is concerned 
with private wrongs. Indeed, if what I have argued above is sound, then this understanding also 
supports the ‘criminal’ process in criminal law and the ‘civil’ process in the civil law of torts (and 
contracts). 
 
5. 
This paper does not purport to offer clear criteria for criminalization, let alone what 
exactly should or should not be criminalized; and for that matter, neither is this paper about 
what exactly should or should not be subjected to the civil law of torts. Rather, it is about the 
concepts that come into play when we think about criminal law and criminalization, how we 
should understand them, and the roles that they should play in our theorization of the criminal 
law and criminalization. I have argued for two claims: (a) we should not understand ‘public 
wrongs’ merely as wrongs that properly concern the public. This is because if that is the case, 
then not just criminal law, but also tort law, should both be understood as being concerned 
with public wrongs; and (b) criminal law should be understood as primarily concerned with 
responding to, by way of punishment, wrongs that properly concern the public; while tort law 
should be understood as being primarily concerned with responding to such wrongs by way of 
compensation. If all this is true, we should therefore understand ‘public wrongs’ as wrongs that 
should be punished by the state, and ‘private wrongs’ as wrongs that the state should, for those 
who suffer losses because of them, determine and obtain the compensation that they are 
entitled to from the perpetrators; while bearing in mind that (i) a wrong can merit both state 
punishment and compensation of losses by the perpetrator, and (ii) they are all wrongs that 
properly concern the public. The ‘publicness’ of public wrongs does not lie so much in the fact 
that they are wrongs that properly concern the public. This is because ‘private wrongs’ are also 
wrongs that properly concern the public, if we are to maintain that tort law is concerned with 
private wrongs, as I have argued in section 2. Rather, their ‘publicness’ lies in the nature of the 
punitive response that is owed to them, in which the state (as the public) plays a distinctive role 
that is altogether absent in the compensatory response owed to private wrongs; and it is also in 
this sense that private wrongs are ‘private’, as opposed to ‘public’. 
Of course, much more needs to be said about this understanding of ‘private wrongs’. 
This paper mainly focused on torts, and related to contracts at various points; but what about 
trusts and unjust enrichments? However, given that I am more interested in the criminal law 
and criminalization in this paper; I would like to end this paper by discussing what follows from 
the above understanding of ‘public wrongs’, and put ‘private wrongs’ aside for another 
occasion.  
There is nothing particularly novel about the above understanding of ‘public wrongs’. 
Lamond also argues that ‘public wrongs’ should be understood as wrongs that the state, as the 
public community, is responsible for punishing; and he makes it clear that what he means by 
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that is that they are wrongs which ought to be punished by the state.53 But in any case, if 
‘public wrongs’ is to be understood in this way, then this has some rather significant 
implications on its role in thinking about the normative issue of criminalization. 
To a certain extent, the overall argument advanced in this paper about ‘public wrongs’ is 
a deflationary one. If ‘public wrongs’, as I have argued, is to be understood as wrongs that 
should be punished by the state, then insofar as the question of what should be criminalized is 
essentially the same question as what should be punished by the state, appealing to the notion 
of ‘public wrongs’ here would be rather circular and unhelpful. It is merely a placeholder for 
whatever that should be punished by the state, and this advances nothing to our understanding 
of what indeed should be punished by the state, and hence indeed should be criminalized. To 
advance our understanding here, and answer the question adequately, we need to look past 
the notion of ‘public wrongs’ to the underlying grounds for state punishment; and this involves 
asking the following questions: Is it a wrong? Is it a wrong that properly concerns the public? Is 
it a wrong that merits punishment? Is it a wrong that merits not just punishment, but state 
punishment? Do those who commit such wrongs deserve to be punished? Etc…54 Of course, 
there is still the issue of whether we have asked all the relevant questions here;55 but once we 
have answered all of them adequately, what we then have is already an answer to the question 
of what should be criminalized. The notion of ‘public wrongs’ is therefore only an idle wheel in 
all this.56 The same can also be said for ‘private wrongs’, insofar as it plays the same kind of role 
in the normative theorization of the civil law of torts (and contracts).  
If all this is true, we are then faced with the following dilemma: On the one hand, 
despite what has been argued so far, we may still insist that ‘public wrongs’ should be 
understood merely as wrongs that properly concern the public. It would then be non-circular 
and helpful. But then we would have to distinguish it clearly from what we mean, when we 
follow Blackstone, in saying that criminal law is concerned with public wrongs while tort law is 
concerned with private wrongs; and acknowledge that ‘public wrongs’ in this sense is as 
relevant to the latter as it is to the former. On the other hand, we might accept what has been 
argued so far, and understand ‘public wrongs’ as wrongs that should be punished by the state. 
In that case, we need to admit ‘public wrongs’ is circular and unhelpful; and that it is the 
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grounds for state punishment, and the multifarious considerations that bear on them, that are 
doing the real work here. 
Yet, if the arguments in this paper are sound, then I think we should grab the second 
horn of the dilemma. Not only would this allow us to maintain Blackstone’s distinction, it would 
also highlight the importance of the multifarious considerations that bear on the issue of 
criminalization. Furthermore, it would also show, as I have tried to in this paper, that what is 
distinctive about criminal law is also the kind of response that it affords to wrongs, the role that 
the state should play in it, and the legal process that is appropriate to it; and all these are just 
as important as the nature and the kinds of wrongs that properly concern the public, when we 
are thinking about the normative issue of criminalization.   
 
